Inability to identify weaknesses or to quantify advancements in software system robustness frequently hinders the development of robust software systems. E orts have been made to develop benchmarks of software robustness to address this problem, but they all su er from signi cant shortcomings. This paper presents the various features that are desirable in a benchmark of system robustness, and evaluates some existing benchmarks according to these features. A new hierarchically structured approach to building robustness benchmarks, which overcomes many de ciencies of past e orts, is also presented. This approach has been applied to building a hierarchically structured benchmark that tests part of the Unix le and virtual memory systems. The resultant benchmark has successfully been used to identify new response class stuctures that were not detected in a similar situation by other less organized techniques.
Introduction
Given the current scarcity of tools to measure the robustness of a software system, operating system developers lack the means to focus their attention on issues a ecting system robustness. System developers have long used suites of performance tests to aid in the development of high performance machines and application programs; we believe that a suite of robustness tests would be similarly useful in gauging the development of robust systems, and in providing a means to compare robustness among various systems. Throughout this paper many examples are presented in the context of evaluating the robustness of an operating system. However, most of the issues examined arise in evaluating the robustness of any complex software system.
A robustness benchmark is a suite of robustness tests, or stimuli. The benchmark should address issues that are general enough to apply to a wide range of systems yet speci c enough to provide a basis for di erentiation according to system robustness. Essentially, a robustness benchmark aims to stimulate the system in ways that are likely to trigger internal errors, and thereby to expose design errors in the error detection or recovery mechanisms. Di erentiation amongst systems should re ect the number of such errors uncovered.
In attempting to design a useful benchmark with the most general applicability, several issues must be considered. For example, if a benchmark simulates memory faults via fault injection into the supervisor code of an operating system (as in Kanawati92] or Kao93]), it is not likely to be easily portable between operating systems, perhaps not even between operating systems that are very similar from an application's point of view { similar operating system interfaces are often backed by very di erent bodies of code. This makes it very di cult to inject faults into supervisor code in such a way that the results can meaningfully be compared across systems. This paper documents several goals that a benchmark of robustness should strive to achieve. Those goals are considered in light of the constraints presented by Unix-like operating systems. We then present the choices we have made in our initial e orts to develop a suite of robustness tests for machines running a Unix-like operating system. After Section 2 describes the motivation for robustness benchmarking, Section 3 presents several characteristics that a benchmark of robustness should attempt to achieve on any computer system. Section 4 subsequently examines constraints and opportunites that arise in the design of a benchmark to be used solely in evaluating the robustness of Unix-like systems. Later document initial e orts into the development of robustness benchmarks and evaluate them as examples of some of the design philosophies presented herein.
Background and Motivation
The development of computer systems has traditionally been motivated by the desire to achieve higher performance. The need to measure progress towards this goal prompted the development of performance benchmarks, which have grown in complexity and sophistication since their inception. The original performance measures of a computer system re ected attempts to compute the average instruction execution time of that system. Later, focus shifted to attempts to measure overall system performance in scenarios designed to re ect common uses of the system. The latter approach led rst to synthetic benchmarks, such as Whetstone Curnow76] and Dhrystone Weicker84] , and then to applications oriented benchmarks such as the SPEC SPEC90] suite, which measures performance under prototypical workloads built from a collection of real applications. Similarly, the advent of reliable computing systems is spurring the development of robustness benchmarks to quantify improvements in system reliability. As robustness benchmarking grows, its focus is also shifting from simple measures of hardware characteristics to measures that re ect the overall reliability of a computing environment (i.e. the hardware together with its supporting software).
To date, much of the e ort in building robust systems has been devoted to building robust hardware. E orts to evaluate the robustness of software systems have become common only recently, and are exempli ed by such studies as Miller90] and Suh93]. These studies both concentrate, like all robustness benchmarks, on studying the behavior produced when a system is subjected to unusual (rather than common-case) stimuli. Both studies perform their evaluations via a collection of isolated tests, and draw conclusions from the collected results. Unfortunately, it is often di cult to evaluate the relative signi cance of each of the individual results collected through such test suites.
For example, Miller90] examines the behavior of Unix utilities when they are supplied with randomly generated input data. The crash of any single utility must be taken as seriously as the crash of any other utility, even though this weighting may not re ect reality, because the benchmark lacks knowledge of the underlying system's structure (so it cannot know if two utilities are related in any way). Thus, if several utilities crash due to a bug in an underlying shared system library, the robustness of the system being measured might be perceived to be unduly low | the robustness benchmark is a ected by a lack of knowledge of the system's structure. Miller90 ] and other such studies are similar to synthetic benchmarks in the performance arena | The validity of these benchmarks depends on the accuracy with which they are constructed to emulate the normal workload of the system. In the case of robustness tests, emulating the \normal workload" refers to maintaining the same frequency distribution of exception conditions that occurs in the system's normal use. This distribution must be maintained to obtain an accurate assessment of the system's robustness when in normal use.
In order to allow more accurate evaluations of overall system robustness, robustness benchmarks must evolve towards a structure that embodies the dependency hierarchy of the system. Benchmarks should allow testing at multiple levels of abstraction, in order to facilitate the isolation of sources of failures, and to help evaluate the severity of any failures encountered. Robustness benchmarks should also be easy to adapt to any new facilities added to an existing system. For example, if a module is added to a software system and is conceptually similar to an older module, test procedures developed for the older module should be easily adaptable to the new module to ensure that such expertise is not lost. Present suites of robustness tests do not address these issues. In this paper we consider how these goals may be achieved without precluding any of the desirable properties found in existing benchmarks of robustness.
General Design Issues
Several issues must be addressed by the designer of any suite of robustness benchmarks. This section presents many desirable properties and mentions tradeo s which may be necessary to attain them.
Portability: First and foremost, it must be possible to use the robustness benchmarks to compare di erent operating environments and computer systems, and thus the benchmarks should be portable across platforms. This goal often restricts the range of tests that can be performed { notably those that require knowledge speci c to one environment, such as is often the case with fault-injection based tests.
Coverage: Ideally, a benchmark should test all possible uses of every system module being tested.
Often, however, the space of such stimuli is too large to permit exhaustive testing. A completely deterministic benchmark may choose to test only the most frequent uses of a module, but experience shows that the common case uses are most often those that are properly debugged. Such a benchmark functions solely as a veri cation suite. Alternatively, a deterministic benchmark may focus solely on unusual uses of a module, thereby providing a better assessment of the robustness of that module. However, problems usually occur at the intersections of rarely occurring events which, taken together, produce an unexpected state. The set of possible event intersections is often too large to explore systematically. Thus, such a benchmark remains limited in its coverage, and is likely to be useful mainly as an aide to debugging the uncommon cases.
A more realistic estimate of the robustness can be obtained by the use of randomized stimulation.
Randomness: Randomized stimulation attempts to uniformly cover the space of possible uses of a module | randomized tests usually have a higher serendipity (i.e. ability to uncover previously unknown errors) than their deterministic counterparts. Note, however, that the nondeterminism introduced by randomized stimulation may lead to loss of repeatability. Sometimes randomized stimulation is required in order to adequately emulate a system's computational model, as is explained in the next section. Some degree of randomness without loss of repeatability is one motivation for an extensible set of benchmarks.
Extensibility: An extensible benchmark provides a means to extend its set of stimuli in a consistent manner, i.e. stimuli can be added to the benchmark in such a way that produces results that are directly comparable with results generated prior to the addition. Extensibility is necessary not only to allow for the addition of stimuli of a di erent nature to be used in testing an existing system module, but also to allow for an existing benchmark to be extended to apply to new system modules. Extensibility ensures that a benchmark is a consistent measure of progress, rather than simply a veri cation suite for an isolated module.
A simple form of extensibility can be achieved through the use of parameterized stimuli. For example, a benchmark suite might consist of a group of stimuli whose behavior is completely determined by the input of a string of random numbers. New sets of tests can be generated (thereby increasing coverage) by varying the input string, whereas every test set generated maintains repeatability. The extensibility of such a benchmark is rather restricted, however, as only limited variation can be achieved in tests by varying only input parameters. Greater extensibility requires the ability to add completely new testing code while maintaining the consistency of the result processing.
In general, the extensibilty of a benchmark is determined by the degree to which the test control structure of the benchmark can be extended without a ecting the result processing. Hierarchically structured benchmarks provide a general means of achieving extensibility.
Hierarchy of Complexity:
The tests within a set of benchmarks should be organized in order of increasing complexity, where complexity is inversely proportional to the number of modules that can be exercised by a test. The simplest tests are often applicable across multiple system modules (e.g., there are tests of proper resource allocation and deallocation that are applicable to any system module that manages a resource), whereas the most complicated tests are usually highly speci c to a particular module or combination of modules. This organization may be re ected in the tests themselves, such that the most complicated tests can assume that all simpler tests have been passed. In designing a benchmark suite that tests several system modules, it may be desirable to develop a hierarchical interface to those system modules, organized to re ect the hierarchy of their functions { simple tests can then be written in an object-oriented fashion without requiring code duplication (possibly leading to divergence) on a per-module basis. An example of this approach to benchmarking is documented in Section 5.4.
Note that an arrangement of tests in a hierarchy of complexity may lead to a higher initial implementation cost | Some e ort is required to de ne the structure of such a benchmark, unlike the construction of a benchmark composed of a collection of ad hoc tests. However, this initial investment is usually worthwhile due to the desirable properties of a hierarchical structure such as the resultant ease of code reuse when the benchmark is extended.
Reporting of Results: Several characteristics are desirable in the results reported by each test of robustness. As mentioned before, each test result should be repeatable. The results should also be amenable to comparisons between di erent machines { indeed, rather than simply indicating whether each test of robustness was passed or not, it is desirable to report on failed tests using a scale that re ects the severity of the failure. A closely related issue is the amount of localization of triggering events Sullivan91] that is re ected in the reported results | i.e. the extent to which the results pinpoint the error(s) that were detected, and their possible causes. Good localization is especially valuable to system designers trying to focus on improving the depenability of the operating system.
Note that detection of a \failure" (i.e. failed test) in itself raises a number of di culties. As many stimuli exercise the system in ways that may not have been anticipated by its creators, a \golden standard" for correctness is often absent. The developers of a robustness benchmark might choose to overcome this problem by de ning a standard of correctness, or even a measure of incorrectness. For example, a scale ranking errors in terms of their severity, ranging from unanticipated error code returns to complete system crashes, could serve as a yardstick of incorrectness. Alternatively, the benchmark itself could be augmented with the ability to learn and record a \correct" result. For example, the developers of a benchmark may de ne the correct result to be the result most commonly produced in a particular abnormal scenario 1 | The benchmark itself can then be used to determine the most common results. A third possible approach involves de ning only the possible \incorrect" results, and assuming that anything else is correct. (For example, the e ects of a system call invoked with garbage parameters could be de ned as being correct as long as the operating system does not crash, the le system is left intact, and other executing processes are una ected.)
A benchmark suite may also elect to compute an \index of robustness" from the individual test results. Such a result serves to provide a very high level means of comparing two machines, and is generally a weighted average of the individual test results. The set of weights used generally 1 Such an approach measures behavioral consistency of modules across the domain of the test. re ects the perceived severity of each of the errors detected, and may depend upon the number of system modules a ected by the error, its likelihood of occurrence in daily operation, the range of applications a ected, the speci c type of error involved, and whether the system was only able to detect the error, or whether it detected and corrected the error.
Benchmarks for Unix-like Systems
Unix-like operating systems are available on a wide spectrum of hardware platforms ranging from personal computers to supercomputers. As all of these operating systems attempt to provide similar interfaces and functionality, benchmarks can be written for the purposes of comparing their robustness. This section describes opportunities and limitations that constrain the development of a benchmark suite designed speci cally to test Unix-like operating systems. As such, most of the issues raised are in addition to those presented in the previous section. Note that many other multi-user multitasking timeshared operating systems present similar constraints; we attempt to point out features of Unix that are relevant to robust benchmarking e orts, although most do not restrict the applicability of the work to other non-Unix operating systems.
Goal of a Unix Benchmark
Unix-like operating systems are primarily used to support applications that require support for multiple processes and multiple users. Even in \single user" setups, processes owned by at least two di erent users are usually present on the system (processes owned by the system administrator, and those owned by one or more users). The function of the operating system is to manage access to hardware resources, and to ensure that the running processes do not a ect each other adversely. This suggests that the robustness of an operating system should re ect the system's ability to successfully contain fault conditions generated by any one process (i.e. re ect the ability of the operating system to prevent those faults from a ecting other processes). Thus, a system crash is considered to be the extreme case of failure to localize a fault, as it means that all other processes are a ected. A Unix benchmark suite should thus attempt to measure the ability of each module to contain errors, on a module by module basis for each of the several testable modules and interfaces existing on most systems.
Benchmark Structure

Gross Structure
Unix systems provide at least the following modules together with their interfaces: le system, virtual memory, process management, and signal handling. Most also provide network support and window management. A simple benchmark suite might consist of a series of independent test programs, each of which exercises one module. However, such a test does not accurately re ect the fact that under normal use, each system module must support simultaneous interaction with several programs. Thus multithreading, or support for running and monitoring several simple programs simultaneously, is required for a representative test of fault handling scenarios that may arise in regular use. Note that a multithreaded benchmark is also able to test the system's ability to handle the propagation of multiple faults simultaneously occurring in distinct modules. Thus, a robustness benchmark for Unix-like systems should have multiple threads | a feature that also proves convenient in measuring the extent to which a fault propagates (described later).
There is another disadvantage in designing a benchmark suite made up of one test program per system module. A system may have several modules, and the incremental cost of adding a new, widely applicable test to the test suite is high | the new test must be implemented once for every module involved. However, if the new test simply manipulates modules in a manner that can be abstracted beyond a standardized module interface, the test need only be coded once; module-speci c code below the interface handles all interaction with the system modules and is unchanged. This is the motivation for hierarchical structuring of benchmarks. Unix systems support enough modules to justify implementing a hierarchically structured system interface to allow tests to be be coded in an object-oriented manner, without code duplication. (For an example of such an implementation approach, see Section 5.4.) Note also that a hierarchical approach enforces consistency of result reporting simply by eliminating multiple copies of functionally similar testing and reporting code | each test is implemented exactly once at an abstract level, thereby guaranteeing compatibility of test reports across modules.
Finally, it should be noted that portability considerations often require that the code of a benchmark suite be limited to a user-level implementation. Unix-like kernels often di er substantially in their implementation. Had this not been the case there would presumably be little or no di erence in robustness among the various avors of Unix. Thus any benchmark that requires kernel-level support is not likely to be easily portable across a wide range of Unix platforms.
The Measurement of Faults
The following criteria might be used to evaluate the seriousness of a fault condition (in increasing order of severity):
1. Does the fault a ect the process causing it? 2 2. Does the fault a ect other executing processes? 3. Does the fault crash the operating system? 4. Does the fault crash the operating system microkernel? 3 An uncontained fault may a ect another executing process in one of several ways. It may cause the other process to crash (without having crashed the entire operating system), to produce incorrect output, or to simply to execute more slowly than it otherwise would. Note that the process causing the fault may be a ected in a similar manner; however, if the causing process is the benchmark itself, the benchmark will not be able to detect the fault without the aid of an external monitoring agent, such as a watchdog started before beginning the tests.
2
In practice, this measure is limited by a benchmark's ability to detect changes made to its own state.
3
Of course, this applies only to systems that are built on top of a microkernel. The possible e ects of a fault may be classi ed according to any of several taxonomies, such as those of Barton90], Cristian91], or Suh93], which are summarized in Table 1 . All of these taxonomies necessitate a means of measuring the e ect on processes other than those owned by the benchmark itself. This may be done by observing a \sacri cial program" which is executed concurrently with the benchmark suite, and checking to see how it is a ected by the faults generated by the benchmark suite. Note that almost all of the possible resultant states of the sacri cial program (as enumerated by Table 1 ) can be detected mechanically by a \watchdog" program that has been previously calibrated to the expected behavior of the sacri cial program. If the fault should produce a complete system crash, however, the watchdog may be unable to observe this fact, unless it is executing on a separate processor that is isolated from the one used to execute the tests. If a separate processor is not available human intervention may be required in the event of a system crash.
A sacri cial program should, of course, make widespread use of the system to increase the probability that it will re ect any e ects of uncontained faults. A robustness benchmark suite might elect to provide a synthetic program to serve as a sacri cial program, or it may choose to make use of any of several performance benchmark suites, such as the SPECmarks, which have the advantage of widespread availability. If a system is being evaluated for its ability to run one particular application without failure, that application itself might well serve as the sacri cial program.
It should be pointed out that the use of a sacri cial program has a marked e ect on some of the properties of the benchmark. In particular, any robustness benchmark employing a sacri cial workload is a multithreaded benchmark and as such su ers all the disadvantages of being multithreaded (e.g. the resultant benchmark is likely to lose both determinism and repeatability). However, as mentioned earlier, multithreading is also more representative of the application computing model supported by the operating system. The use of multithreading is discussed further in a later section.
Recording of Results
Most Unix-like systems provide no stable data repository, so a robustness benchmark must implement a means of recording results in the face of adverse conditions produced by the testing. As the possible e ects of a test are often unknown, this can be rather di cult to implement. Any bu ered output channel is susceptible to data loss in an operating system crash; most of the output channels available to a user-level process fall into this category. A simple but non-automated way to overcome this problem involves printing results to an unbu ered CRT or printer port monitored by a human. A similar e ect might also be achieved through the use of an unbu ered serial line output to communicate results to a second \watchdog" processor. If a serial line is not available, the same arrangement, with a greater chance of losing a small amount of data, can be approximated by communicating results to a second computer over a local area network. In the last case, logging with variable granularity (i.e. if a test causes a crash, the test is repeated while synchronously writing the log to disk more frequently than before) may help to reduce the amount of data loss, although it cannot completely overcome the e ects of data bu ering by the kernel.
Randomness and Extensibility
In order to provide good coverage of the test space, a robustness benchmark may opt to use tests whose behavior is dependent upon the output of a random number generator. However, such a test may not execute exactly the same actions on di erent systems if the output of the random number generator changes. Most Unix systems provide a random number generator interface (random()) that is identical across implementations, but which is not guaranteed to produce exactly the same stream of random numbers from machine to machine 4 . This brings into question the value of comparing randomized runs made on two di erent machines, a problem that can be resolved through \controlled randomness" whereby streams of random numbers are pregenerated and stored in a le in advance. These pregenerated numbers are then fed to the benchmark at run time, thereby ensuring that benchmark runs on two di erent machines behave in a manner determined by identical sets of random numbers. Note that the Unix random number generator produces the same stream of random numbers from run to run on any given machine (for a given seed) and thus does not a ect repeatability of results on a single machine.
Nevertheless, repeatability is often di cult to achieve in any realistic robustness benchmark of a Unix system because Unix systems do not usually provide deterministic process schedulers. Thus, any test that presents the system with a multithreaded workload (in order to evaluate the system's ability to handle multiple simultaneous requests) will introduce some randomness into the result of the robustness test. Consequently, the results of any such test may not always be repeatable, as the scheduling order is likely to vary from run to run. This problem cannot usually be resolved in a portable manner if a robustness suite wants to test a multitasking environment. Unfortunately, Unix schedulers do not normally provide hooks to allow repeatable or deterministic process scheduling. A multithreaded benchmark scheduling its own threads may reduce the severity of this problem, but does not provide a complete solution because the benchmark as a whole remains subject to the scheduling actions of the system-wide scheduler.
Summary
Unix environments provide a level of programming support adequate for benchmarks ranging from simple tests based on the perturbation of an input string to more complex hierarchical tests which are extensible at both abstract and module-speci c levels. When the requirements of robustness benchmarks are better understood, Unix may well provide a testbed for the development of a Table 3 : The properties of various example benchmarks. Properties marked \variable" are unconstrained by the design of the benchmark, and vary between the individual tests in the benchmark.
language in which robustness tests can be expressed with minimal e ort. At present, Unix environments provide modular interfaces which are can be organized into a hierarchy. This permits hierarchically organized benchmarks, from which new benchmarks can be derived with only a small amount of e ort via inheritance. An initial approach to such an implementation is described in Section 5.4. Table 2 summarizes the relationships between the properties of a benchmark and the implementation choices made while constructing it. As can be seen from the table, these implementation choices a ect most of the important characteristics of any robustness benchmark. The next section provides several examples of benchmarks exhibiting the tabulated relationships.
Some Examples of Robustness Benchmarks
This section presents initial e orts in producing benchmarks of system robustness. Each example is evaluated with respect to the design issues presented in Section 3. benchmarks are summarized in Table 3 and are described in more detail below.
\Crashme"
Crashme is a simple, publicly available test of robustness for Unix systems. This program allocates an array, and lls this array with random data. Subsequently it spawns o several child processes that all try to execute this array of data as if it were code. The parent crashme process observes its children and spawns replacements for the children as they take exceptions and die. When crashme is run, the Unix system is subjected to a large number of varied exception conditions in a short period of time | as a result both the error detection and handling capabilities of the operating system are severely tested. Crashme succeeds in crashing a large number of Unix systems. Albeit from a very small sample of machines, we observed that the amount of time an operating system stayed up under crashme appears to be correlated to some degree with our observed reliability of that operating system in day to day use. (Refer to Table 4.) Crashme is a very good test of a system's ability to handle a high error rate, but in many ways it is not a good general purpose benchmark of robustness. Although it is portable and has good coverage of the stimulus space (and a correspondingly high serendipity), the results from crashme are very limited | either the system crashes, or it does not crash. If the system crashes, it is very di cult to determine the cause of the crash (and any such determination could only be a result of error logging external to crashme itself, such as error logging provided by the operating system). Crashme also lacks repeatability | a high degree of randomness is introduced due to the scheduling of a large number of child processes created by the program. If the test is run twice, and the system crashes both times, it cannot be determined whether or not both crashes shared a common cause. Due to the di culty of interpreting its results, crashme is only of limited usefulness as a measure of progress in building a robust system.
CMU Crashme
Having observed the aforementioned problems with crashme, we attempted to remedy them by restricting the coverage of the test, hoping to gain repeatability and better localization of triggering events. The spawned child processes were constrained to exercising only a single well- Mach 3.0 (MK82) no crash* * became unusably sluggish after 30 secs Table 5 : Time taken by CMU crashme to crash some machines de ned system interface | namely, the Unix system calls. It was anticipated that the error checking on parameters passed to system calls would be su cient to guarantee that system calls made with randomly generated parameters would not be able to crash the operating system. Much to our surprise, many of the systems tested were vulnerable to this limited test. (Refer to Table 5.)
Although this modi ed version of crashme still exhibits a high degree of nondeterminism, it o ers better localization of triggering events than the original version. This localization can be further improved by restricting the tests to only a subset of the Unix system calls. Such restriction, together with the monitoring of system calls via the sentry mechanism described in Russinovich92], has been used successfully to identify some errors in the Mach 3.0 Unix server.
Modular Benchmarks
Another approach is that of modular benchmarking. Modular benchmarks are separate tests of individual system modules. These benchmarks are constructed by regarding the system as a collection of isolated modules, and writing one or more tests to exercise each module independently. One example of a modular benchmark is documented in Suh93]. Another example is a set of robustness benchmarks that was recently constructed at CMU to test the robustness of the Advanced Spaceborne Computer Module (ASCM) Dingman93]. Although this is an embedded system running a real-time operating system not related to Unix, it can be regarded as a collection of system modules in much the same way as any other operating system. The ASCM test suite consisted of distinct tests to exercise the various system modules ( le system, memory system, external communication, locking support and multi-program operations) together with a watchdog program (similar to the parent crashme process) to monitor and collect the results of the tests.
An example of a modular benchmark . Each test case is classed as having produced the correct result (correct), having returned an unexpected error code (unexpected error), having indicated success in spite of having been given invalid input parameters (bad success), having caused the operating system to terminate the benchmark (terminated), having caused a warm restart of the system (warm restart), or having necessitated a cold restart of the system (cold restart).
for each call from the interface de nition of that call. For example, the read file call takes 3 parameters: a le handle, the starting address of a bu er into which data is to be read, and the number of words to be read from the le. The benchmark chooses a value for each of the parameters from a set of values that are based on the parameter's type. For example, a le handle might point at a valid le that is closed, at a valid le that was opened in read-only mode, or at a deleted le, among other possibilities. By choosing all possible test input combinations for all of the parameters of the read file call, the benchmark generates 252 test cases, as shown in Table 6 .
The results of the 252 tests are then divided into six groups in increasing order of severity: those that produced the expected result (correct); those that returned with an error code, but not one of those that would be expected given the input parameters (unexpected error); those that returned indicating success in spite of having been given invalid input parameters (bad success); those that caused the operating system to terminate the benchmark (terminated); those that caused a warm restart of the system (warm restart); and those that caused a cold restart of the system (cold restart). The results of these 252 tests on the read file and write file calls, which take identical sets of inputs (and thus generate the same test parameter combinations), are shown in Table 7 .
The advantages of the modular benchmarking approach include relatively low complexity of the individual tests (because inter-module interactions are usually not considered), and the ability to guarantee determinism. Unfortunately, modular benchmarks also have several disadvantages.
Although the modular benchmark approach applies well to hardware, where system components are manufactured separately, and are often designed for independent testability, the approach does not scale well to large bodies of operating systems software, whose modules are often closely intertwined, making independent testing di cult. Here, this testing paradigm is not matched well to the system being evaluated. A di erent problem may occur when a modularly written system, seemingly well suited to modular testing, is evaluated. In this case, the modular decomposition of the benchmark suite restricts the coverage of individual tests, and eliminates any possibility of stimulating interactions between system modules. In addition, modular benchmarks are also unable to take advantage of the similarities between system modules. While it is quite likely that some similarities will exist between the many modules in a system, modular benchmarking requires that any similar tests applicable to multiple modules be coded once for each applicable module in the appropriate test. Thus, similarities between modules are hidden within the individual tests | a signi cant loss, because such similarities are the key to extensibility, as explained in the next section.
Modular benchmarks o er no guarantee that the results of similar tests, or even of two di erent revisions of the same test, are comparable with each other. In e ect, while all comparisons are external to the benchmark (i.e. they are done by the human, or by an automated postprocessor, who collects the results of the individual tests), all information determining their comparability (the abstract nature of the tests) is completely hidden from the evaluator. This problem limits the usefulness, as a measure of progress in the development of a system, of any modular benchmark that goes beyond simple interface veri cation. For example, improvements to a system module may render a modular benchmark incompatible with its test simply because implementation details changed. The original test may still apply at an abstract level, but modular benchmarks enforce no separation between the abstract test they apply and the interfacing of this test to the module being tested. Consequently, a modular test often needs to be adapted in response to any signi cant change in a module. When such an adaptation is made, great care must be taken if the results of the adapted test are to remain directly comparable to results from the original version.
In order to illustrate the last point, consider the changes to a benchmark that might be necessitated by an incompatible upgrade of a system module (e.g., the change from version 10 to version 11 of the X window system). The old and new versions of the module provide the same functionality, and thus any tests of the old system are applicable to the new module. However, part of any benchmark code must be rewritten to accomodate the interface change. This rewriting involves \module interface code" which interfaces the system module being tested to the benchmark's test routines. If results of the updated benchmark are to remain comparable to those of the original benchmark, care must be taken not to modify code other than the module interface code (e.g., code for purposes such as result gathering and processing should not be changed). As modular benchmarks do not require separation of the module interface code and testing code, the necessary modi cations may be complex, and must be performed with great care.
A Hierarchical Approach
Given the shortcomings of modular benchmarks, it would seem that decomposition of a system into multiple unrelated modules is not the best approach to organizing a suite of robustness tests. Consider the following set of identical tests, taken from the ASCM benchmarking suite. These tests appear in the benchmarks of both the le system and of the memory bu er system. <object> is used to denote either a le or a memory bu er in the list:
Reference <object> before it has been created. Reference <object> after is has been deleted. Delete an active <object>. Write past the end of <object>. Read before the beginning of <object>. Allocate <object>s until resources are exhausted.
These tests represent just a few examples of stimuli that are applicable to multiple modules, but are hidden within individual modular benchmarks. As a result, similar tests are being performed, and their results are potentially comparable to one another, but this may not be apparent in the results.
One way to remedy this problem is to abstract the tests and their associated result processing, separating them from the implementation details of the various modules by a clearly de ned interface layer. However, this one-step decomposition is not su cient, because it does not delineate the range of applicability of any given test. Some tests may be applicable to all modules, while others might only apply to a subset, etc. We believe that the correct way to decompose a software system in order to test it is through the use of a class hierarchy. Once all of a system's features are organized into a hierarchy of classes, a test can be speci ed to apply to one or more particular classes. One possible class hierarchy that might be used to organize the testing of a Unix system is shown in Figure 1 .
Note that the modular ASCM benchmarks described earlier actually represent an example of a simple hierarchy with only one level of abstraction. The ASCM benchmark generates tests for a module by looking at the interface to that module | sets of test input parameters, selected so as to be of the correct data types, are chosen for each call implemented by the module. For any input parameter of a given type, there is a predetermined list of inputs that may be used to instantiate that parameter. Thus, one can think of the interface to a call in a module as being a class inheriting from a set of base classes, where each base class corresponds to one input parameter type. The class corresponding to a particular call inherits from all of the input parameter types that describe its arguments, and the test applicable to such a class is composition of tests applicable to each of its base classes.
A proposed hierarchy
As the management of various resources is a primary function of any operating system, Figure  1 is one possible starting point in the construction of a benchmark of robustness. Note that the hierarchy contains many abstract classes (e.g., Storage Object) which do not correspond to any single system module, but rather serve as the fundamental means of grouping modules by similarity. This explicit grouping is the basis for the organization of a hierarchically structured benchmark suite. It also provides the mechanism for orderly extension of the benchmark suite.
In order to construct a hierarchical benchmark, a hierarchically structured interface to the operating system must rst be implemented. Unix does not provide such an interface, so a hierarchical interface library must be developed to support the subsequent construction of robustness tests. The construction of such an interface proceeds as follows. Having decided upon the hierarchy to be implemented, the designer must choose an appropriate set of methods to be de ned in the interface to each class. For example, the methods allocate and deallocate might be de ned for the top-level class Resource. Shared Resource, which inherits from Resource might add the methods lock and unlock to those already de ned by Resource. Great care must be taken to de ne these methods with su cient generality to apply to all modules that will be their descendants. An instance of a particular class (e.g. File) is required to implement all methods from all abstract classes that are its ancestors. Whenever a method can be implemented in a completely module independent way, it should be de ned in the most general abstract class to which it applies. Subclasses and instances of this class may chose to rede ne the default implementation with a more speci c one.
Note that operating systems of the future are likely to provide object-oriented hierarchical interfaces to their facilities and will thereby eliminate the need to construct the interface library. Note also that hierarchical interfaces and benchmarks are most easily written in a language that supports object-oriented programming (such as C++), but can also be written in more traditional languages (such as C) with some extra e ort on the part of the programmer. The experimental hierarchy has been written in C++.
Using a hierarchy to build a benchmark
Once a hierarchical interface to the operating system has been built, any operating system test not requiring module-speci c knowledge can be written in an abstract manner. The test should be implemented at the most abstract possible level in the class hierarchy to which it applies. For example, a test of resource exhaustion by repeated allocation (mentioned in Section 5.4) requires only an allocate method from the module that it is testing. As such, it should be coded to take a parameter of class Resource, and to use the allocate method provided by all Resources. Once the test has been coded for a particular class, it can automatically be applied to any of the descendants of that class. In the case of the resource overallocation test, the test can be applied to all of the system modules at the base of the hierarchy (including les and memory bu ers). In contrast, consider a test that checks for correct system behavior upon writing past the end of an object. This test requires the notion that the object be able to store information, and that it have a beginning and an end. In this case, the test applies to the class Storage Object and its subclasses.
Once a test has been encoded at the appropriate level of abstraction, any result processing associated with the test should be encoded at the same level. Thus the result processing is allowed to have knowledge of the speci city of the test (e.g., it might want to use such knowledge to scale the results of the test according to some weight assigned to the severity of a failure in that class). Most importantly, however, both the test and the result processing for the test are coded exactly once, in an abstract way. This guarantees comparability of the results obtained from applying the test to multiple modules. Because exactly one copy of the test is used for its multiple applications, there is no way for inconsistencies to arise, as might occur when multiple copies are present (e.g., with modular benchmarks).
Hierarchical benchmarks are also easily extensible in a consistent manner due to their organization. If the benchmark suite is to be extended to a include a new module, the interface to that module is encoded as a subclass of the appropriate class within the hierarchical interface to the operating system. If the new module is related in any way to existing modules, its placement re ects these relationships. Any tests that have been developed for the existing modules can be applied to the new module immediately. Again there is no possibility of duplicating test code if the new module is positioned correctly in the hierarchy, and consistency in testing and result processing is guaranteed to have been maintained across the extension.
Finally, note that while hierarchical structuring o ers superior extensibility, reduction of coding costs (through code reuse) and the potential for better organization of result reporting, it is not antagonistic to achieving any of the other goals desirable in a benchmark (portability, coverage, localization of triggering events, etc). Thus hierarchical benchmarks o er some special bene ts without sacri cing the desirable qualities o ered by other benchmark styles.
Hierarchical testing using C++
Hierarchically structured benchmarks are most easily implemented in a language that provides support for inheritance. This section presents some trivial tests that demonstrate the use of C++ in building a hierarchy, and in constructing tests using that hierarchy. The tests presented are intended solely to illustrate the programming paradigm. Readers who are familiar with C++ may wish to skip to the next section, which presents a more complicated example of a hierarchical test which was actually implemented.
Given the hierarchy from Figure 1 , the signi cant parts of a declaration of class Resource might look as follows:
class Resource { public: virtual int allocate (int n) =0; virtual int deallocate (int id, int n) =0; };
Resource is an abstract class (i.e. it does not correspond to any single system module), so the implementations of methods allocate and deallocate are not provided, and are hence marked \=0." The Storage Object abstract class inherits from Resource, and supplies some additional methods:
class Storage_Object : public Resource { public: virtual void set_mode (object_mode mode); virtual object_mode get_mode(); virtual int read_data (char *buf, int len) =0; virtual int write_data (char *buf, int len) =0;
protected: enum object_mode mode_spec; // mode of object };
The Storage Object class provides two more methods (read data and write data) that will be implemented by classes inheriting from it. Default implementations are also provided of two methods that manage the mode of the storage object. Classes inheriting from Storage Object may override the de nitions of set mode and get mode if they so desire, as these methods are declared as being virtual. Finally, the file object class is declared as follows:
class file_object: public Storage_Object { public: // Resource methods int allocate (int n); int deallocate (int id, int n); // Storage_Object methods. void set_mode (object_mode mode); int read_data (char *buf, int length); int write_data (char *buf, int length); (...) };
The file object class must implement all of the unimplemented methods that it has inherited from its ancestors. It also chooses to override the default implementation of set mode, replacing it with an enhanced version that manipulates the mode bits of the underlying le on disk, and then calls the original default implementation. The resource test can be applied to both the file object and the process object, but the storage object test is only applicable to the file object, because the process object is not a Storage object.
An example hierarchical test
As a simple illustration of a hierarchical benchmark, the hierarchical analog to part of the ASCM benchmark was constructed for a Unix system. Observe that the read file and write file tests described in Section 5.3 require only those capabilities that are de ned by the class Storage Object. The hierarchical Unix benchmark implements these as tests of the Storage Object class, making use of the read data and write data methods respectively. The file object and memory object classes, which are de ned in our hierarchical interface library as subclasses of Storage Object, were evaluated using this benchmark. Implementation: Both the read data and the write data benchmarks are composed of two parts. The rst part generates the objects (i.e. file objects or memory objects) which are used in the testing. This part embodies module-speci c knowledge, as it must know at least the data type of the object to be generated, and may need to know the internal details of the object being generated. For example, it may need to know that an object encapsulating a closed le is required. The second part of the benchmark embodies the abstracted test routine itself. This part of the test is usually written at the highest possible level of abstraction, and does not embody any modulespeci c knowledge. For example, the read data and write data tests are written to apply to any Storage Object, and do not require further knowledge of the object they are testing. Thus, the code for testing a file object looks like:
for i = 1 to num_test_objects { Storage_Object obj; obj = file_test_lib::get_test_obj(i); test_storage_object(obj); } The routine test storage object can be applied to any storage object, such as a le or a piece of virtual memory. In this particular case, it conducts tests of reading and writing using all possible combinations of test bu er addresses and I/O request sizes. On the other hand, get test obj() is a module-dependent routine, implemented by each of the modules tested, that makes use of local module-speci c knowledge to generate the objects to be tested. In the example shown, it returns a file object, which is passed to test storage object and treated like any other Storage Object.
Result processing: The hierarchical benchmark implemented maintains the six result classications de ned by the ASCM modular benchmark with a seemingly slight, but important, change. The ASCM error class terminated has been replaced by an unexpected termination class, and terminations that are the expected outcome of a test are instead counted as correct. The reason for this change is discussed later.
The structure of the result processing code resembles that of the testing code in that test results are also processed by a module-dependent and a module-independent routine. A module-speci c analysis routine is supplied by each module being tested, and evaluates the outcome of the test in view of the characteristics of the particular object that was tested. In a system without a systemwide integrated error handler, the module-speci c routine is also able to examine module-speci c error return mechanisms and incorporate their feedback into its analysis. Unlike the modulespeci c routine, the module-independent routine, also known as the test-speci c routine, has no detailed knowledge of the object being tested, but has detailed knowledge only about the test that was applied. It is aware of the tested object only at the same level of abstraction as the test itself was. The test-speci c routine is applicable across all modules that are tested. It evaluates outcomes based on system-wide error handling information, and on the observed behavior of the tested object. Note that some information may be available to both result-processing routines, and should be used by both of them in analyzing the outcome of the test.
Given the goal of classifying test results into one of the six classes described above, the two analysis routines each return correct, unexpected error, unexpected termination, or bad success. These evaluations correspond to the rst four possible result classi cations respectively. The module-speci c and test-speci c evaluations are then combined to yield the nal classi cation of the outcome, which falls into one of these four classes. In situations where either of the remaining two possible outcomes (warm restart or cold restart) occur, the occurrence is detected by an external monitoring agent (such as a human). In these two cases, the outcome is indisputable, and no further module-speci c or test-speci c analysis need be performed.
Consider, for example, a write data test which attempts to write 1024 bytes of data to a Storage Object that encapsulates a closed le, passing in a bu er that points to only 256 bytes of data. After the test has run, it is the job of the module-speci c routine, which is aware of the internal details of the Storage Object, to check whether the result indicates an invalid attempt to write to a closed le, as the module-speci c routine is aware that the le object being written was actually closed. If the error code returned agrees with this predicted outcome, the module-speci c routine indicates a correct return. Otherwise, it indicates bad success or unexpected error, as appropriate. The module-independent routine, on the other hand, is aware only of dealing with a Storage Object, but knows that the test attempted to write more data than was actually supplied to the write data call. It therefore checks to see how much data the test claimed to have written successfully, and once again classi es the outcome as being in one of the four aforementioned categories. The two evaluations are then combined according to the following principles, which are employed to produce the matrix of Table 8: If a call succeeds (i.e. didn't return an error code), both result analyses must agree that success was the expected outcome in order for the result to be deemed correct. This is because an error stimulus can be introduced into the test by either the module-speci c object generation, or by the abstract test code initialization, without the knowledge of the other. Thus, if either one of the analyses expects an error as the correct outcome, the correct outcome must be an error, e.g., if write data is called on a le that is open for writing, but is passed a NULL bu er and asked to write 1024 bytes, only the test-speci c routine will predict an error as being the correct outcome. (This is because the decision to use a NULL bu er would have been made by the test-speci c initialization code.) If executing this test does not trigger an error as predicted, the outcome is correctly classi ed as a bad success. Conversely, if a call fails with an error, only one of the analyses need accept this error as the correct outcome in order for the result to be deemed correct. Once again, this is because it is possible (and likely) that only one of the two parts of the testing code is aware of a stimulus that is expected to cause an error condition. In the example above, suppose the call failed, and that the return code indicated that invalid data had been passed to the write data call. Only the module-independent routine would have su cient information to classify this as being the correct outcome. To the module-dependent independent routine, knowing only that a valid storage object was being written to, the error return would look like an unexpected error return. If a call produces a termination, only one result analysis need accept this termination as being correct (i.e. expected) in order for the outcome to be considered correct. The justi cation for this case is analogous to that of handling the failure of a call. The occurrence of an unexpected termination precludes the possibility of an unexpected error or a bad success. The analysis routines may not disagree on whether or not the benchmark was terminated. The analysis routines may disagree on whether a call failed or not. This may seem counterintuitive, and should not be a common occurrence. However, it may occur in the presence of error return channels 5 that are not available to both analyses for examination. For example, a module-speci c error-return channel might indicate to only the module-speci c routine that a test had failed. Alternatively, the test-speci c routine might conclude that a test had failed by observing behavioral data not available to the module-speci c routine. In cases of such disagreement, one analysis may return a bad success while the other returns unexpected error. The correct combination of these two results yields unexpected error because the analysis that detected an error had error indication channels available to it that were not available to the routine that did not indicate an error.
Note that the analysis routines in this implementation observe and analyze test termination by the operating system. This is done in order to classify each termination as having been correct or having been an unexpected termination. Had the original ASCM classi cation been retained, classifying terminations in a group unto themselves, benchmark termination would not have required further analysis; terminations could simply have been monitored and handled in the same way as cold restarts or warm restarts. However, the implementation of the hierarchical benchmark exposed a problem with the ASCM result classi cation that renders this simpler scheme unusable.
The hierarchical benchmark was initially implemented and run on a file object module interfacing to part of a Mach 3.0 lesystem. With minimal e ort (restricted to extending the hierarchical OS interface library), the same test was later run on a memory object module, interfacing to the virtual memory system. The results of running the benchmark are shown in Table 9 .
These results serve to demonstrate one of the valuable bene ts of hierarchical testing, namely that of enforcing consistency across modules in result processing, which is especially valuable when a benchmark is extended. The hierarchical benchmark had initially been implemented using the ASCM result classi cation scheme, which works reasonably well in the context of le management, because process termination is not the expected outcome of any le operation. However, process termination is often the correct means of signalling an error in interactions with the virtual memory Table 9 : Evaluation of the file object and memory object modules using the hierarchical benchmark. The result classes used are those de ned by the ASCM benchmark described in Section 5.3, modi ed so that the terminated class has been replaced with a class containing only unexpected terminations. Terminations which were the expected outcome of a test are counted as being correct.
The number of correct outcomes that were due to expected terminations is included in parentheses in the table, and represents the number of results that would have been misclassi ed by the ASCM scheme.
system (e.g., as in the case of an attempt to reference an invalid address). When the benchmark was extended to test memory objects in addition to file objects, the limitations of the ASCM scheme became apparent; many otherwise correct outcomes were simply classi ed as terminated.
As can be seen from Table 9 , the large numbers of test outcomes that are misclassi ed by the ASCM scheme might lead to a conclusion that the virtual memory system was of very low quality. (Due to the misclassi cations, less than 10% of the tests would have appeared to have produced the correct outcome.) However, further analysis revealed that the result classi cation system, and not the virtual memory system, was at fault. This led to the modi ed result classi cations, wherein terminations are classed as either correct or unexpected termination. The original shortcoming of the result analysis was made obvious by the hierarchical structure of the benchmark, which enforced comparability of the results across the two modules. A more ad hoc modular approach to the problem might easily have obscured it.
In addition, it should be noted that this case study exempli es one of the potential pitfalls of robustness benchmark design | it is di cult to de ne error classes without knowing the outcomes of all possible tests to which those classes may be applied. The ASCM benchmark, for example, de ned the terminated class in the absence of enough data to evaluate its suitability. The ASCM evaluations of the le module (see Table 7 ) show no occurrences of terminated tests at all, and only a few occurrences are reported for other modules that were similarly tested. In such cases, hierarchical testing serves, by enforcing consistency in result processing, to maintain a \placeholder" for result classes that are not well characterized. When more data on the vague classi cation become available, the hierarchical framework serves as a guide towards correct characterization of this new result class.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, current robustness benchmark e orts have been examined. These approaches all fail to address certain issues that are critical to the long-term success of a robustness test suite. Several such issues have been delineated, and a proposed benchmarking organization that overcomes many of these problems has been outlined. The proposed hierarchical benchmarking organization does not adversely a ect the desirable properties that have been attained by benchmarks to date. In particular, the proposal imposes a hierarchical, extensible structure upon test suites; this structure may mandate a higher initial implementation e ort, but promises to improve the lifespan and maintainability of any robustness benchmark that is in use for a long period of time.
There remain several opportunities for improvement that have not been explored in the discussion of an extensible hierarchy. For example, hierarchically structured testing facilitates the combination of individual tests results into an overall \index of robustness". It also suggests a system for determining the relative importance of each of the individual results. In addition, the possibility of extending the hierarchical structure to include benchmarks that operate via fault injection has not been explored, mainly because simple fault injection violates the notion that testing procedures should be abstracted from the implementation details whenever possible. The possibility of reconciling this di erence (via an abstracted form of fault injection) should be explored.
Much of the work presented herein has been carried out in the context of measuring the robustness of a Unix-like operating system. The kernel of the operating system has been regarded as an opaque, monolithic entity. However, the advent of micro-kernel based operating systems presents an opportunity for the lowest levels of such a hierarchical benchmark to focus on the robustness of the layers beneath the operating system server | i.e. on the micro-kernel itself. Hierarchically structured benchmarks can easily be extended to incorporate the notion of benchmarking one level deeper (simply by adding one or more layers to the bottom of the benchmark hierarchy).
Finally, this approach to measuring robustness can be applied easily to any large software system that was written in a modular manner. Such application promises the same extensibility, low maintenance cost, and consistency that is obtained in a similar benchmark of operating system robustness. The detailed investigation of such applications remains to be pursued.
